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No. 70-279 
United States y. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. 
Appeal from the USDC for MD Florida 
-
This case; held for decision in No. 71-227, United States 
y. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., involves the Seaboard Coast 
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Re: No. 70-279 U. S. v. Florida East 
Coast Railway 
Dear Bill: 
When you opinion is ready to be released, please note at 
the end that I took no part in the coo.sideration or decisioo. of the 
case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
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RE: No. 70-279 United States v. Florida 
East Coast Rail way 
Dear Bill: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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STATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. FLORIDA ------
EAST COAST RAILWAY CO. AND SEABOARD 
COAST LINE RAILROAD CO. 
ON APPEAL FROM 'l'HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
No. 70- 279. Decided November -, 1971 
PEn CuRIAM. 
The question is whether the Interstate Commerce 
Commission procedures used in this rate case "for the 
submission of . . . evidence in written form" avoided 
prejudice to the appellees so as to comport with the re-
quirements of § 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act.' 
The Government appeals from the District Court's order 
remanding this case to the Commission for further pro-
ceedings on the incentive per diem rates to be paid by 
1 In its relevant part, § 7 provides: "In rulo making ... an 
agency may, when a party will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt 
procedures for the submission of all or part of the evidence in 
written form." 5 U. S. C. § 556 (d) (emphasis added). 
Our decision in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp ., 
ante, p. -, holding that § 7 of the Administra1ive Procedure Act 
was inapplicable to certain rulcmaking procedures under § 1 (14) (a) 
of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (14) (a), docs not 
ar1ply to the fact s of this cnsc. In A/legheny-L11dlum, we dealt with 
the Commission's general rulcmaking powers under the first sentence 
of § 1 (14) (a). We held thnt such rulcmaking was not required to 
be "on the record" under § 5 (c) of the Administrative Procerdure 
Act, 5 U. S. C. § 553 (c), and that § 7, therefore, was inapplicable. 
In the present case, by contrast, we deal with Commission incentive 
per diem rulemaking under the 1966 amendments to the Interstate 
Commerce Act where Congress has conditioned Commission action 
upon extensive fnctual inquiries and preconditions. In surh cases, 
we conclude that Commission rulemaking was to be "on the record". 
and that § 7 applies. 
2 UNITED STATES v. FLORIDA EAST COAST R. CO. 
the appellee railroads for the standard boxcars they use. 
We affirm. 
In 1966, Congress amended § 1 (14) (a) of the Inter-
state Commerce Act to require that the Commission 
.investigate the use of methods of incentive compensation 
to alleviate any shortage of freight cars "and encourage 
the acquisition and maintenance of a car supply adequate 
to meet the needs of commerce and the national defense." 
49 U. S. C. § 1 (14) (a). While the Commission was 
given the discretion to exempt carriers from incentive 
payments "in the national interest," it was denied the 
power to "make any incentive element applicable to any 
type of freight car the supply of which the Commission 
finds to be adequate .... " Ibid. 
The Commission's initial investigation under this au-
thority (31 Fed. Reg. 9240) was terminated without 
action because it "produced no reliable information re-
specting the quantum of interim incentive charge neces-
sary to meet the statutory standards." 332 I. C. C. 11, 
16. A subsequent study of boxcar supply and demand 
conditions (32 Fed. Reg. 20987) yielded data which were 
compiled in an interim report containing tentative 
charges and which were submitted to the railroads for 
comment. 337 I. C. C. 183. Although the Commission 
was admittedly uncertain whether its proposed charges 
would accomplish the statutory objective, id., at 191, 
and even though "the opportunity to present evidence 
and arguments" was contemplated, id., at 183, congres-
sional impatience militated against further delay in 
implementing § 1 (14) (a). 2 Consequently, the Com-
mission rejected the requests of the appellees and other 
railroads for further hearings and promulgated an in-
centive per diem rate schedule for standard boxcars. 
337 I. C. C. 217. 
2 Sec Hearing:; Before the Subcommittee on Surface Tr:ln::;porta-
tion of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 9lst Cong., l::;t Ses::; . 
(1969) . 
UNITED STATES v. FLORIDA EAST COAST R. CO. 3 
Appellees then brought this action in the District 
Court alleging that they were "prejudiced" within the 
meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act by the 
Commission's failure to afford them a proper hearing. 
Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 725 
(MD Fla., 1971). Seaboard argued that it had been 
damaged by what it alleged to be the Commission's 
sudden change in emphasis from specialty to unequipped 
boxcars and that it would lose some $1.8 million as the 
result of the Commission's allegedly hasty and experi-
mental action. Florida East Coast raised significant 
challenges to the statistical validity of the Commission's 
data 3 and also contended that its status as a terminating 
railroad left it with a surfeit of standard boxcars which 
should exempt it from the requirement to pay incentive 
charges. 
Appellees in other words argue that the inadequacy 
of the supply of standard boxcars was not sufficiently 
established by the Commission's procedures. Seaboard 
contends that specialty freight cars have supplanted 
standard boxcars and Florida East Coast challenges the 
accuracy of the Commission's findings. 
In its interim report, the Commission indicated that 
there would be an "opportunity to present evidence and 
arguments." The appellees could reasonably expect that 
the later hearings would give them the opportunity to 
substantiate and elaborate the criticisms they set forth 
in their initial objections to the interim report. That 
alone would not necessarily support the claim of "preju-
dice." But we conclude that "prejudice" was shown 
3 Florida East Coast argues, for example, that the Commission's 
finding of a boxcar shortage may be attributable to a variety of 
sampling or definitional errors, asserting that it is unrealistic to. 
define boxcar deficiencies in such a manner as "to show as a 
'deficiency' the failure to supply a car on the day requested by the 
shipper no matter when the request was received." The Go\·ern-
ment's contention that a 24-hour standard was not used seems un-
responsive to this argument. See 337 I. C. C., at 221. 
4 UNITED STATES v. FLORIDA EAST COAST R. CO. 
when it was claimed that the very basis on which the 
Commission rested its finding was vulnerable because it 
lacked statistical validity or other reasoned basis. In 
that narrow group of cases we conclude that prejudice 
for lack of a proper hearing is shown. 
It is argued that Long Island R. Co. v. United States, 
318 F. Supp. 490 (EDNY 1970), presents a conflict re-
quiring plenary consideration of the present case. Both 
Long Island and the present case involve challenges 
to the Commission's procedures establishing incentive 
per diem rates. In Long Island, however, the railroad 
pointed to no specific challenges to the Commission's 
findings (318 F. Supp., at 499) and the trial was con-
ducted on stipulated issues involving the right to an 
oral hearing. !d., at 491 n. 2. Since Long Island pre-
sented no information which might have caused the 
Commission to reach a different result,4 there was no 
showing of prejudice and a fortiori no right to an oral 
hearing. In the present case, by contrast, we have spe-
cific factual disputes and the issue is the narrow one of 
whether written submission of evidence without oral 
argument was prejudicial. 
4 In the Long Island case the court, speaking through Judge 
Friendly, said: 
"Whether there was to be an oral hearing or not, the Long Island's 
first job was to examine the basic data and find this out. Nothing 
stood in its way. . . . If, on examining the data, the Long Island 
had pointed to specifics on which it needed to cross-examine or 
present live rebuttal testimony and the Commission had declined to 
grant an oral hearing, we would have a different case. Instead the 
Long Island's request for an oral hearing was silent as to any respect 
in which the Commission's disclosure of greater detail or cross-
examination of the Commission's staff was needed to enable it to 
mount a more effective argument against the Commission's proposal. 
The last sentence of § 556 (d) would be deprived of all meaning if 
this were held sufficient to put the agency on notice that 'prejudice' 
would result from the denial of an oral hearing. Even taking into 
account the further representations that have been made to us, we 
f:lil to see that prejudice has been established." 318 F. Supp., at 499 . 
UNITED STATES v. FLORIDA EAST COAST R. CO. & 
In affirming the order of the District Court, we of 
course intimate no views on the merits of the underlying 
controversy. 
Affirmed .. 
MR. JusTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
I do not doubt that if presented with the facts of this 
case the three-judge court which decided Long Island R. 
Co. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490 (EDNY 1970), 
would have handed down a decision opposite to the one 
we are now reviewing. I would note this case to de-
termine which court is correct in its perception of the 
obligations of the ICC. 
~n.ptmu ~(lltrt ~1f tlrt> ~1tritd'r ..§tutes 
'J)traslringtan, p. (!}. 20?)1.;! 
CHAMBERS OF 




I talked with Bill Rehnquist and 
he has not had sufficient time to study 
No. 70-279 - u. s. v. Florida East Coast, 
so I suggest it be put on the next 
Conference List so that it can be explored 
by the Conference and determined whether 
it should be put down for oral argument or 
disposed of summarily. 
The new sentence that Bill Rehnquist 
put into his Allegheny opinion (71-227) 
eliminates any possibility of a conflict 
with Florida East Coast. 
O.Douglas 
The Chief Justice 
CC: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.§u:vrttttt Q}cu:d cf ttrt 'J!Uritt~ ~tafug 
'llagfrhtgtcn.IO. QJ. 2!l&t>!.2 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 6, 1972 
Re: No. 70-279 - u.s. and r.c.c. v. Florida 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your ~ curiam. 
Sincerely, rl. 
ft-
Mr. Justice Douglas 
cc: Conference 
• ........ ,. ,r }._ ._ i 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UN T~ TATES r.. \ 
~!:tr u a e' __\ >L(~L ~ 
No. 70-279 :&aoiroulated : 
United States et al., 
Appellants, 
v. 
Florida East Coast Railway 
Company et al. 
On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
the Middle District of 
Florida. 
[January-, 1973J 
MR. JusTICI~ REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Appellees, t\vO railroad companies, brought this action 
in the District Court of the Middle District of Florida 
to set aside the incentive per diem rates established by 
appellant Interstate Commerce Commission in a rule-
making proceeding. Incentive Per Diem Charges-1968, 
Ex parte No. 252 (Sub No. 1). They challenged the 
order of the Commission on both substantive and pro-
cedural grounds. The District Court sustained ap-
pellees' position that the Commission had failed to 
comply "·ith the applicable provisions of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. ~ 551 et seq., and there-
fore set aside the order without dealing with the railways' 
other contentions. The District Court held that the 
language of ~ 1 (14) (a) 1 of the Interstate Commerce 
'Section 1 (14) (a) providrs: 
"The Commission mn~· , after hearing, on a complaint or upon 
it.-; ow11 initiati,·c without complaint, e:;tabli~h rea~onablc rnlrs, 
rrgulations, and practices with rcsprrt to cnr sen·irr hy common 
rnrrirrs by railroad sub.irrt to 1 hi ' rhaptrr, including 1 he compensa-
tion to be paid and other terms of any ront rn ct, ngrermrn1 , or 
a rrangcment. for the usc of any locomotive, car, or othrr \'Chicle 
not owned by the ranier using it (and whether or noL ownrcl by 
another carrier) , and the penalties or other sanctions for nonobscrv-
70-270-0 PINION 
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Act, 40 U. S. C. ~ 1 (14)( a), required the Commission 
in a proceeding such as this to act in accordance with 
~ 556 (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S. C. 
~ 556 (d) and that the Commission's determination to 
receive submissions from the appellees only in written 
form 'ms a violation of that section because the re-
spondents were "prejudiced" by that determination 
within the meaning of that section. 
}joJlo,Ying our decision last Term in United States v. 
A ller;he11y-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U. S. 742 ( 1972), we 
noted probable jurisdiction. 407 U.S. 908 (Hl72), andre-
quested the parties to brief the question of whether the 
Commission's proceeding was governed by 5 U.S. C.~ 553/ 
aiH'C' of ~neh rnlr~, rrgulal ion~, or praeticr~. In fixin~ ~1wh rompr••~a­
tion to lw paid for thr n~r of an~· t~·pr of frright car, thr C<llnmi~~ion 
:;lwll gi,·r ron~iclrration to thr n:ttion:d Jp,·rl of O\\'IWI'~hip ol' ~nrh 
t~·pc of frright <·nr and to othrr f:trtor,; :1fl'rrting thr :tdrqnae.'· of 
t hr national frl'ight ear ~nppl~·, and ~hall. on the ba~i~ of ~ueh con-
~idrm t ion, drt rrminr whrt hrr <·ornprn~n t ion ~hould hr eont pu 1 Pd 
;;olrl~· on thr ba~i~ of rlrmrut:; of O\\'nrr~hip rxprn~r ill\·oh·Pd in 
O\\'lling and maintnining ~ueh t~·Jw of frpight car, including a f:tir 
rrt Ill' II on Yalur, or whrthrr ~urh eomJWn~n 1 ion ~hould br inrrrn~rd 
h~· ;.:ueh inrPnti\'<' drmrnt or rlrnwnt:; of romprn~ntion a~ in thr 
Commi~~ion'~ judgmrnt \\'ill pro,·idr ju;;t and rra:sonablr romprl•~a­
tion to frright rar 0\\'IIN~, rontributr to ~ound ear ~rn·ier praeti<·r~ 
(including rffirirnt utiliwtion and di,;tribution of rnr~), nnd mrom-
a~~:r thr nrqui~ition and mninlrnanrr ol' a r:tr ~uppl~· adrqt1:1tr to 
mrrt thr nrrd~ of rommriTC' and thr n:1tionnl ddrn~<'. Thr Com-
mi~~imt ~hall not makr any inrrnti,·r rlrmrnt :tpplie:tblr to :til,\' t~·1w 
ol' l'rri~~:ht rar thr ~uppl~· ol' \\'hirh thr Cornmi~~ion find~ to be 
:Hirqua t r a ncl m:t.\' rxrmpt from t lw comprn~:t t ion to lw ]):tid b~ · 
:tn~· group of rarrirr,; ~urh inernt j,·r rlrmrnt or rlrmPnt~ if thr 
Commi~~ion find:-; it to lw in thr nntional intrrr~t." 
"'·~ .558 Rulr mnking 
"(:1) Thi~ ~rction nppli<'~. ar·r·ording to thr proYi~ion~ th<'l'rof, 
rxcrpt to tlw rxtrnt that t hNr i~ im·oh·rd-
"(1) a milit:tr~· or forri~~:n afT:tir:-; fun<·tion of th<' (lnitPd Stnt<'~: or 
'· (2) a matt C'l' rrb t ing to agrnr~· man:t~rnwnt or Jlf'r~onnrl or to 
publi<· Jli'Oprrt,\·, lonn~. grant~, lwnrfit;;, or rontrart~. 
''(b) Crnrr:tl notirr of propo~rd rnlr rna king ~h:tll br pub] i~hrd 
70-270-0PTNION 
UNlTtm STATES v. FLOHTDA EART COAST H. CO. 3 
or by ~~ 556" and 557.' of the Administrative Pro-
cedure 1\ct. 'Ve here decide that the Commission' 
proceeding "·as govrrnecl only by ~ 553 of that Act, 
in thr Frdrral Tirgi .. <trr, unlrs~ prr.-<on~ subjret thrrrto arc namrd 
nnd rit hrr prr~on:ill~· ~rr\'('CI or ot hrnri~r hnYr art tt:il not irr t hrrrof 
in arrordnncr with law. Thr not icr shnll ineludc-
"(1) :1 ~tatrmrnt of thr timr, pi:IC'C', and nntmr of public ruh> 
rna king procredings; 
"(2) rdrrrnrr to the lrgal authorit~· undrr whieh thr rule is 
propo ... rd: and 
'·(:~) rithrr thr terms or ~ubst:mcr of thr proposrd rulr or a 
dr:'cript ion of t hr ~ubjrct~ and is~ur" im·oh'ed. 
"Excrpt when notirr or hr:1ring i~ rwptir<'d h~· ~tatute , thi~ subsection 
dor" not a ppl~·-
'·(.\) to intrrpretnti,·r ru!r:', grnrral ~tntrmrnts of polir~·. or rulrs 
of agrnr~· org:1nir.at ion, prorrdurc, or praetiee; or 
"(B) whrn thr agerw~· for good cau~r finds (and inrorporntrs 
t hr finding nnd a brirf st n trment of rra"ons t hrrrfor in t hr rulrs 
i"~urd) that noti(·r nnd publie prorrdmr thrrron arr impr:1cticahlr, 
unnN·c>.-<~ar~·. or rontmr~· to thr publir interest. 
"(c) Aftrr notirr rcquirrd b~· thi~ srrtion, thr ngrnc~· 'hnll giw 
int<•rc•,trd prr,;ons nn opportunit~· to pnrtic•ipntr in thr nt!r making 
through ~ubmi""ion of writtrn dnta, ,·irw", or nrgumrnt~ with or 
without oppor·ttmit~· for ornl prr"c·ntation. After ronsidrration of 
thr rr]r,·ant mattrr prrsrntrd, thr agrnr~· shnll inrorporntr in thr 
rulr~ :tdoptrd a conri~r stntrmrnt of thrir ba~i~ nnd pmpo~r. Whrn 
mlr~ nrr rrquirrd b~· Htntulr to hr m:tdr on thr rrrord nftrr 
opportuuit~· for nn agrrw~· hrnring, srrtions 51)(3 nne! 1)157 of this 
tit lr fiJl]ll~ · instrnd of thi" suh~rct ion. 
"(d) Thr rrquirrd pnblic·ntion or ~rn· irr of n suh~t:mti,·r rnlr 
slwll hr mndr not Jr,-s than 00 dn~·~ hrforr il~ riTrrti,·c datr. rxrrpt-
" (1) a snb~t:tnti,·r rulr which gmnt~ or rrrognizcs :1n rxrmption 
or rrl irYr~ a rr,-t rirt ion: 
" (2) intrrprrtnt i,·r rnlr,.; and ~tntrmrnt~ of polir~· : or 
" (0) n~ othrrwi,.;r proYidrd b~· thr :tgrnr~· for good c:lusr found 
nnd puhti~hrd with 1hr rulr. 
" (r ) Enrh agrnr~· shall gi,·r an intNr,.;trd per,;on lhr right to 
prtit ion for t hr is,.;unnrr, nrnrndmrnt. or rrprnl of :1 rulr." 
:l ''§Mo. Hr:trings; prr~iding rmplo~·rr~: powrr~ and dnt ir~: hur-
drn of proof: rvidrncr: rrcorcl as bn~i,.; of drri~ion 
" (a) Thi,.; ,.;rrtion npplir . ;, arcording to thr pro,·i~ions thrrrof, 1o 
r F ootnole J, is on p. 51 
70-279-0 [>J"XlO"X 
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and that appellees received the "hearing" required by 
~ 1 (14)( a) of the Interstate Commerce Act. We there-
fore reverse the judgment of the District Court and 
llC'nring~ required b~· se('tion 5.'n or 554 of thi~ title to hr ronductrd 
in accordance with thi~ ~eetion. 
"(b) Thrre ~hall prr,-ide at theta king of l'l·idence-
"(1) the agenr~·: 
'· (2) one or more member~ of the bod.1· whirh eompri~c·-< 1 he 
n~rnc~·; or 
"(:'!) onr or more hearing rxaminers appointed under seetion 
:nos of thi~ title. 
''ThiH subchapter does not ~uprrsedr the condnrt of ~peeified classes 
ol' proceeding~. in 11·holr or in part , b~· or before board~ or other em-
plo~·ers special!~· proYided for b~· or designatrd undN statute. The 
fnnct ions of pre~;iding emplo~·ees and of emplo~·ee~ pa rtiripa t ing in 
decisions in ncrordnnre with srction 557 of thi~ title shall be ron-
durted in an impartinl manner. A presiding or pnrticipating rm-
plo~·ee ma~· at an~· time disqualif~· himself. On the filing in good 
fnith of a timel~· and :;uffieient affida1·it of ]1rr~onal bins or other 
di~qnalification of a pre:;iding or participating rmplo~·ee, the agency 
~hall determine the mattN as a part of thr rrcord and derision in the 
cn~e. 
''(c) Subject to published rules of the agenc~· and within its JlOIYers, 
employees pre:;iding at hearing:; ma~·-
,, (1) administer oaths and affirmations; 
''(2) issue :;ubpenns authorized by law; 
"en rulr on offers of proof and rrceive relevant evidence; 
" ( 4) take depo~it ion:; or have depositions taken when 1 he end::; 
of jm;t ire would be ~rrvrd; 
" ( 5) regul ate the cour~e of the hearing; 
"(6 ) hold conferences for 1ht> settlement or simplicat ion of the 
i~~ue;; b~· consent of the partie~; 
"(7 ) dispose of procrclurnl requests or similar matter~; 
'· (8) make or recommend decisions in :~rcordanre with ~ed ion 
.5 .37 of this title: and 
"(9) take othN action authorized by agency rule consi~tent with 
t hi~ Htbchapter. 
"(d) Except as o1hcrwi~c providE'cl by statute, the pro]JOnrnt of a 
rnl(' or orciN ha" the burden of proof. Any oral or documentar~· cvi-
drnee ma~' be received, but the agenr~· a~ a matter of polie~· ~hall 
pr01·ide for thr exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial , or undul~· repeti-
70-279-0 PlNIO~ 
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remand the case to that court for further consideration 
of appellees' other contentions that were raised there but 
which we do not decide. 
tiou~ rvidence. A ~anrtion may not be impo~ed or rulr or order 
i~~urd rxcept on consiclcrat ion of thr \\'hole record or thosr parts 
t hrreof cit rcl b~· a part~· and ~upport <•d b.'' a ml in nccordamr with 1 hr 
rrliablr, probntive, nnd substantinl evidrnce. A party is entitled 
to preHent his cn!>e or drfen~r by oral or documrntar~· r1·idrncr, to 
~ubmit rebuttnl evidrnrr, and to conduct such cro~~-rxaminat ion ns 
ma~· br required for n full and true di::;do~urr of the factK In rulr 
mnking or determining claim;; for monr~· or benefits or applications 
for initial licrnse:; an ngrncy mn~·, whrn a party will not be prejudiced 
thcrrb~·, adopt procedure~ for the submi~~ion of all or pnrt of the 
rvidcnce in written form. 
" (e) The transcript of tc~t imony nne! exhibits, together with nll 
papers and rrqucsts filE'd in the procercling, constitute~ thr rxclusive 
rrcord for decision in accordance with section 557 of this title and, on 
payment of lnwfully pre::;cribecl costs, shall br mncle availnble to the 
partie~. When an agency cleci~ion rests on official notice of a 
materinl fact not appearing in the evidence in the rrcorcl, a party is 
<·ntitiE'd, on timrl~· request, to an opportunit~· to show the contrary." 
1 "§ 557. Initial deci~ions; conclusivenr~~; rrview b~· agrnc~·; sub-
mission~ b~· parties; content;,; of decision~; record 
'' (n) Thi~ section applie~, nccording to the provision::; thereof, when 
a henring is rrquired to be ronducted in arcordnnce with section 
556 of this title. 
''( b) When the agrncy did not preside at the reception of t hr rvi-
dence , the prrsiding rmplo)·ee or, ill cases not ~ubject to srct ion 554 
(d) of this title, an employee qualified to pre~idr at hearings pm::;u-
nnt to sect ion 55G of thi~ title , shall initially decide the ca8e unlrss 
the agrncy require~ , either in ~pec ific casrs or b~r general rule , the 
rntire record to be certified to it for drcision. When the presiding 
rmplo~·ee mnkes an initial clcci:sion, that drci~ion then become,.; the 
deci::; ion of the agenc~· without fmther proceeding::; nnle~::; thrre i~ an 
nppral to, or rrview on motion of, thr agrnc~· within time provided by 
rulr. On nppral from or review of thr initial deci::;ion , the ngrnry 
ha~ all the powrr::; which it would hn\'C' in mnking thr initial drci-
s ion except as it may limit the issttc~ on not ier or b~ · rule. When 
thr ag<'Jte~· makes the der ision wilhout IHtl·ing presiclrd at the 
reeept ion of t hr evidence, the wrsiding rmplo~·ee or an emplo~·ee 
<1ualifird to pre~ide at hearing~ pursuant to section 550 of thi ,.; title 
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I. BACKGH01IND OF CHnONIC FREIGHT CAn SHORTAGES 
This case arises from the factual background of a 
chronic freight car shortage on the Nation's railroads 
which we described in United States v. Alleghe11y-Ludlum 
Steel Corp., supm. Judge Simpson, writing for the Dis-
trict Court in this case, noted that "[fi or a number of 
years portions of the nation have been plagued "·ith 
seasonal shortages of freight cars in '"hich to ship goods." 
322 F. Supp. 725, 726 (MD Fla. 1971). Judge Friendly, 
writing for a three-judge district court in the Eastern 
District of New York in the related case of Long Island 
R. Co. v. Uniled Slates, 318 F. Supp. 490, 491 (EDNY 
1970), described the Commission's order as "the latest 
chapter in a long history of freight car shortages m 
~hall fir~t rrrommrnd a deci~i ~m, rxcrpt that in rule mnking or 
drtNmining npplirntion~ for initial lirrn~es-
' '(1) in:;trad thrrrof thr ngrnr~· ma~· i~~ur a tentnti,·r dcri~ion 
or onr of it~ re~pon~iblc cmplo~·rp~ ma~· rrromrnrnd a dcri~ion: or 
'· (2) thi,; proerdurr ma~· hr omit trcl in a ra~r in which the agrnry 
find~ on the rerord that clur and timrl~· rxrrution of it~ function,; 
imperat i\·el_,. and unaYoiclably so I'C'(]Ilires. 
" (r) Brfore a rreommrndrd, initial, or trntntin• drl· i~ion, or :1 drri-
~ion on ngrnr~· rr,·irw of tllC' deC'i~ion of ;;uborclinnte rmplo~·rrs, the 
partir,; arr rntit!Pd to a rrm;onablr opportunit.\· to Rnbmit for thr rcn-
;;idNation of thr rmplo~·rrs participating in the derisions-
.. (1) propo~rcl finding~ and eonrlu~ions; or 
·· (2) rxrrptions to thr dcriHion~ or rrrommrndrd drri~ions of 
suhorclinatr emplo~·rrs or to trntat in' agPmoy drei~ion~: nnd 
"'(:3) supporting rrnsons for 1 hr rxrrptions or propo~rd findings 
or ronrlnsionR. 
"The rrrord shall E<how ihr ruling on raeh finding, ronrlu~ion, or 
rxrrption prr~rntrd. All drciRiOll~ , including in it in!, rrromml•ndrd, 
and trntativr drci~ion~ , arr a part of thr rreord :1nd ~hnll inrlnclr a 
R1ntrmrnt of-
"(A) findings and conclu::; ion~. and thr rrnRon~ or bn~i~ thrre-
for, on all thr matrrinl i~~urs of fnrt, law, or di~rrrtion prr~rntrd 
on t hr rrrord ; and 
" (B) the appropriate rulr, ordrr. sanrticm, rrlirf or drninl thrrrof." 
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certain regions and seasons and of attempts to ease 
them." Congressional concern for the problem was man-
ifested in the enactment in 1066 of an amendment to 
~ 1 (14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, enlarging 
the Commission's authority to pre cribe per diem charges 
for the use by one railroad of freight cars owned by 
another. Pub. L. 89- 430. 80 Stat. 168. The Senate 
Committee on Commerce stated in its report accompany-
1 ng this legislation: 
"Car shortage , which once were confined to the 
Mid-\Vest during harvest seasons. have become in-
creasingly more frequent, more severe. and nation-
wide in scope as the national freight car supply has 
plummeted." S. Rep. No. 386. 80th Cong. , 1st Sess., 
pp. 1-2. 
The Commission in 1966 commenced an investigation 
Ex parte No. 252, Incentive Per Diem Charges, "rtJo 
determine whether information presently available war-
ranted the establishment of an incentive element increase, 
on an interim basis. to apply pending further study and 
investigation." 332 I. C. C. 11. 12 (1967). Statements 
of position were received from the Commission staff 
and a number of railroads. Hearings were conducted 
at which witnesses were examined. In October 1967, the 
Commission rendered a decision discontinuing the earlier 
proceeding. but announcing a program of further investi-
gation into the general subject. 
In December 1967, the Commission initiated the rule-
making procedure giving rise to the order which appellees 
here challenge. It directed Class I and Class II line-
haul railroads to compile and to report detailed infor-
mation with respect to freight car demand and supply 
at numerous sample stations for selected days of thc 
week during 12 four-\veek periods beginning January 29, 
1968. 
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Some of the affected railroads voiced questions about 
the proposed study or requested modification in the study 
procedures outlined by the Commission in its notice of 
proposed rulemaking. In response to petitions setting 
forth these carriers' views, the Commission staff held 
an informal conference in April 1968, at which the 
objections and proposed modifications were discussed. 
Twenty railroads. including appellee Seaboard, were rC'p-
resented at this conference, at which the Commission's 
staff sought to answer questions about reporting methods 
to accommodate individual circumstances of particular 
railroads. The conference adjourned on a note that un-
doubtedly left the impression that hearings would be 
held at some future date. A detailed report of the con-
ference was sent to all parties to the proceeding before 
the Commission. 
The results of the information thus collected were 
analyzed and presented to Congress by the Commission 
during a hearing before the Subcommittee on Surface 
Transportation of the Senate Committee on Commerce 
in May 1969. Members of the Subcommittee expressed 
dissatisfaction with the Commission's slow pace in exer-
cising the authority which had been conferred upon it 
by the 1966 Amendments to the Interstate Commerce 
Act. Judge Simpson in his opinion for the District 
Court said: 
"Members of the Senate Subcommittee on Surface 
Transportation expressed considerable dissatisfaction 
with the Commission's apparent inability to take 
effective steps towards eliminating the national 
shortage of freight cars. Comments were general 
that the Commission was conducting too many 
hearings and taking too little action. Senators 
pressed for more action and less talk, but Commis-
sion counsel expressed doubt respecting the Com-
mission's statutory power to act without additional 
hearings." 322 F. Supp., at 727. 
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Judge Friendly, describing the same event in Long 
Island R. Co. v. United States, supra, said: 
"To say that the presentation was not received 
with enthusiasm would be a considerable under-
statement. Senators voiced displeasure at the Com-
mission's long delay at taking action under the 1966 
Amendment, engaged in some merriment over what 
was regarded as an unintelligible discussion of 
methodology . . . and expressed doubt about the 
need for a hearing . . . . But the Commission's gen-
eral counsel insisted that a hearing was needed .. . 
and the Chairman of the Commission agreed .... " 
318 F. Supp., at 494. 
The Commission, now apparently imbued with a new 
sense of mission, issued in December 1969 an interim 
report announcing its tentative decision to adopt incen-
tive per diem charges on standard box cars based on 
the information compiled by the railroads. The sub-
stantive decision reached by the Commission was that 
so-called "incentive" per diem charges should be paid 
by any railroad using on its lines a standard box car--L 
owned by another railroad. Before the enactment of l 
the 1966 amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 
it was generally thought that the Commission's author-
ity to fix per diem payments for freight car use was 
limited to setting an amount that reflected fair return 
on investment for the owning railroad, without any 
regard being had for the desirability of prompt return 
to the owning line or for the encouragement of addi-
tional purchases of freight cars by the railroads as a 
method of investing capital. The Commission concluded 
however, that in view of the 1966 amendment it could 
impose additional "incentive" per diem charges to spur 
prompt return of existing cars and to make acquisition 
of new cars financially attractive to the railroads. It 
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did so by means of a proposed schedule that established 
such charges on an across-the-board basis for all common 
carriers by railroads subject to the Interstate Commerce 
Act. Embodied in the report was a proposed rule adopt-
ing the Commission's tentative conclusions and a notice 
to the railroads to file statements of position within 60 
days. couched in the following language: 
"That verified statements of facts, briefs. and state-
ments of position respecting the tentative conclusions 
reached in the said interim report, the rules and 
regulations proposed in the Appendix to this order, 
and any other pertinent matter, are hereby invited 
to be submitted pursuant to the filing schedule set 
forth belmY by any interested person whether or not 
such person is already a party to this proceeding. 
"That any party requesting oral hearing shall set 
forth with specificity the need therefor and the evi-
dence to be adduced." 49 CFR § 1036. 
Both appellee rail\\"ays filed statements objecting to 
the Commission's proposal and requesting an oral hear-
ing, as did numerous other railroads. In April 1970, the 
Commission , without having held further "hearings," 
issued a supplemental report, making some modifica-
tions in the tentative conclusions earlier reached. but 
overruling in toto the requests of appellees Seaboard 
uncl Florida East Coast. 
The District Court held that in so doing the Com-
mission violated ~ 556 (d) of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. and it was on this basis that it set aside 
the order of the Commission. 
II. APPLLCADILITY OF ADniiNISTTIATIYE PROCEDL' HE AcT 
In United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Si<'el Corp., 
supra, we held that the language of ~ 1 (14)(a) of the 
Int0rstate Commerce Act authorizing the Commis-
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sion to act "after hearing" was not the equivalent of a 
requirement that a rule be made "on the record after 
opportunity_~· . an agency hearing" as the la.tter term 
is used in ~ 5(J3 (c) of the AdministratiYe Procedure Act. 
Since the 1966 amendment to ~ 1 (14)(a), under which 
tho Commission was hero proceeding. does not by its 
terms add to the hearing requirement contained in the 
earlier language, tho same result should obtain here 
unless that amendment contains language that is tanta-
mount to such a requirement. Appellees contend that 
such language is found in the provisions of that Act 
requiring that: 
"The Commission shall give consideration to the 
national level of ownership of such type of freight 
car and to other factors affecting the adequacy of 
this national freight car supply, and shall. on the 
basis of such consideration. determine whether com-
pensation should be computed .... " 
While this language is undoubtedly a mandate to the 
Commission to consider tho factors there set forth in 
roaching any conclusion as to imposition of per diem 
incentive charges, it adds to the hearing requirements 
of tho section neither expressly nor by implication. We 
know of no reason to think that an administrative agency 
in reaching a decision cannot accord consideration to 
factors such as those set forth in the HJ66 amendment 
by means other than a trial-type hearing or tho presenta-
tion of oral argument by the affected parties. Congress 
by that amendment specified necessary components of 
the ultimate decision, but it did not specify tho method 
by which tho Commission should acquire information 
about those components.5 
r. Tho Court of .\ppcnb for the ?\inth Circuit rr:tC'hrd a rr~ ult 
~imilar to that which we rcach in Pacific Coast European Confer-
ence v. U 11iled States, 350 F. 2d 197 ( 1905). Con~truing tho 
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Both of the district courts which reviewed this order-
of the Commission concluded that its proceedings were 
governed by the stricter requirements of ~ ~ 556 and 
557 of the AdministratiYe Procedure Act rather than 
by the provisions of ~ 553 alone.n The conclusion of 
the District Court for the Middle District of Florida, 
which we here review, was based on the assumption 
that the language in § 1 ( 14) (a) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act requiring rulemaking under that section to 
be done "after hearing" was the equivalent of a statutory 
requirement that the rule "be made on the record after 
opportunity for an agency hearing." Such an assump-
tion is inconsistent with our decision in Allegheny-
Ludlum, supra. 
The District Court for the Eastern District of K ew 
York reached the san1c conclusion by a somewhat dif-
ferent line of reas011ing. That court felt that because 
§ 1 (14) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act had re-
quired a "hearing," and because that section 'vas origi-
nally enacted in Hl17, Congress was probably thinking 
in terms of a "hearing" such as that described in the 
authorit~· of the Federal l\Inritime Commi:s:sion under § l..Jb of the 
Rhipping Act of 1916, a~ amended, 46 U. S. C. § 81:3a (Supp. V, 
1064) , that court observed that " ... the authority of thr l'om-
mi~~ion lo permit :such contract~ wa:s limited by rcquirinp: that the 
contr:1rt~ in eight specified rc~prct::; mcrt thr Congre~~ional judg-
mrnt a:; to what the~· i-ihoulcl includr." 350 F. 2cl, at 201. Xot-
wit h~tnnding these explicit tlirrction~ that parti cu lar factor~ be 
r•on~iclerrcl by thr Commis~ion in rcac·hing it:; cleci~ion thl' court 
hrld that the statute':; rrquirrment s of "notice and hearing'' Wl're 
not ~ufficicnt to bring into pia~· thr provi,.;ions of §§ 55() :mel 557 
of the AclminiRt rntive Procrclurc Act. 
6 Both district court opinions wrrc handrcl down beforr our 
rlcci:;ion in United States Y. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., and it 
appear::; from thr record before us that thr Governmrnt in those 
court::; did not rrnlly contr:;t the propo~it ion that thr Commi~~ion's 
proccrdings Wl'rl' p:overnecl b~· ihr ~trictcr stnndarcl~ of §§ 556 
nnd 557. 
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opinion of this Court in the roughly contemporaneous 
case of ICC v. Louisville & }.'ashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 
88, 93 (1913). The ingredients of the "hearing" were 
there said to be that "all parties must be fully apprised 
of the evidence submitted or to be considered. and must 
be given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to in-
spect documellts. and to offer evidence in explanation 
or rebuttal." Combining this view of congressional 
understanding of the terms "hearing" with comments 
by the Chairman of the Commission at the time of the 
adoption of the 1966 legislation regardi11g the necessity 
for "hearings," that court concluded that Congress had 
in effect required that these proceedings be "on the 
record after an opportunity for agency hearing" within 
the meaning of § 553 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act. 
Insofar as this conclusion is grounded on the belief 
that the language "after hearing" of§ 1 (14)(a) without 
more would trigger the applicability of §§ 556 and 557, 
it, too, is contrary to our decision in Allegheny-Ludlum, 
supra. The District Court observed that it was "rather 
hard to believe that the last sentence of § 553 (c) was 
directed only to the few legislative sports where the 
words 'on the record' or their equivalent had found their 
way into the statute book." 318 F. Supp., at 496. This 
is, however, the language which Congress used, and 
since there are statutes on the books that do use these 
very words, see, e. g., the Fulbright Amendment to the 
Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U. S. C. § 43a, and 21 U. S. C. 
§ 371 (e) (3), the regulations provision of the Food and 
Drug Act, adherence to that language cannot be said 
to render the provision nugatory or ineffectual. We 
recognized in Allegheny-Ludlum that the actual words 
"on the record" and "after ... hearing" used in § 553 
were not words of art, and that other statutory language 
having the san1.e meaning could trigger the provisions 
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of ~~ 556 and 557 in rulemaking proceedings. But we 
adhere to our conclusion expressed in that case that 
the phrase "after hearing" in ~ 1 (14) (a) of the Inter-
state Commerce Act does not have such an effect. 
III. "HEARING" REQUIREl\mNT OF ~ 1 (14) (a) OF THE 
IwrEHSTATE CoMMERCE AcT 
Inextricably intertwined with the hearing require-
ment of the Administrative Procedure Act in this case 
is the meaning to be given to the language "after 
hearing" in ~ 1 (14) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act. 
Appellees both here and in the court below contend that 
the Commission procedure here fell short of that re-
quired by the "hC'aring'' rC'quiremC'nt of§ 1 (14)(a), even 
though it may have satisfied ~ 553 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. The Administrative Procedure Act 
states that none of its provisions "limit or repeal addi-
tional requirements in1posed by statute or oth0rwisc 
recognized by law." 5 U.S. C. ~ 559. Thus even though 
the Commission 'vas not required to comply with § § 536 
and 557 of that Act, it was required to accord the "hear-
ing" specified in § 1 (14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce 
Act. Though the District Court did not pass on this 
contention, it is so closely related to the claim based on 
the Administrative Procedure Act that we proceed to 
decide it now. 
If we were to agree with the reasoning of the District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York with respect 
to the type of hearing required by the Interstate Com-
merce Act, the Commission's action might well violate 
those requirements, even though it "·as consistent with 
the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
The term "hearing" in its legal context undoubtedly 
has a host of meanings. 7 Its meaning undoubtedly \\'ill 
7 8('(' 1 D:11·i~, Admini~1ra1iH' Law Trr•:di~r. §H05 (195S). 
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vary depending on \Yhether it is used in the context of 
a rulemaking type proceedillg or in the context of a 
11roceeding devoted to the adjudication of particular 
disputed facts. It is by no means apparent what the 
drafters of the Esch Car Service Act of HJ17, 40 Stat. 
101, which became the first part of ~ 1 (14) (a) of the 
Interstate Commerce Act. meant by the term. Such 
an intent v.-ould surely be an ephemeral one, if indeed 
Congress in 1917 had in mind anything more specific 
than the language it actually used, for none of the 
parties refer to any legislative history which would shed 
light on the intended meaning of the words "after 
hearings." What is apparent, though, is that the term 
was used in granting authority to the Commi~::sion to 
make rules and regulations of a prospective nature. 
Appellees refer us to testimony of the Chairman of 
the Commission to the effect that if the added authority 
ultimately contained in the 1966 amendment "·ere 
enacted, the Commission vvould proceed with "great 
caution" in imposing incentive per diem rates, and to 
statements of both Commission personnel and Members 
of Congress as to the necessity for a "heari11g" before 
Commission action. Certainly the lapse of time of more 
than three years between the enactment of the 1966 
amendment and the Commission's i~::suance of its tenta-
tive conclusions cannot be said to evidence any lack 
of caution on the part of that body. Nor do generalized 
references to the necessity for a hearing advance our 
inquiry, since the statute by its terms requires a "hear-
ing"; the more precise inquiry of whether the hearing 
requirements nece~::sarily include submission of oral 
testimony. cross-examination, or oral arguments is not 
resolved by such comments as these. 
Under these circumstances, confronted with a grant 
of substantive authority made after the Administrative 
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Procedure Act was enacted/ we think that reference to 
that Act, in which Congress devoted itself exclusively to 
questions such as the nature and scope of hearings, is a 
satisfactory basis for cletermiuing what is meant by the 
term "hearing" used in another statute. Turning to 
that act. we are convinced that the term "hearing'' as 
used therein does not necessarily embrace either the 
right to present evidence orally and to cross-examine 
opposing witnesses, or the right to present oral argument 
to the agency's decisionmaker. 
Section 553 excepts from its requirements rulemaking 
devoted to "interpretative rules, general statements of 
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure or 
practice." and rulemaking "when an agency for good 
cause finds ... that notice and public procedure thereon 
are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest." This exception does not apply, however. "when 
notice or hearing is required by statute"; in those cases, 
even though interpretative rulemaking be involved, the 
requirements of § 553 apply. But since thePe require-
ments themselves do not mandate any oral presentation, 
see Allegheny-Ludlum, supra, it cannot be doubted that 
a statute that requires a "hearing" prior to rulemaking 
may in some circumstances be satisfied by procedures 
which meet only the standards of ~ 553. The Court's 
opinion in FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U. S. 33 ( HH34), sup-
ports such a broad definition of the term "hearing." 
Similarly, even where the statute requires that the 
rulemaking procedure take place "on the record after 
8 The Inter~tate Commrrre Act was mnendrd in May 1966; the 
Admini~trativc Procedure Act wa~ si~nificantl~· amended in Srpiem-
ber 1966, but the section detailing the rwoccclurr,; to be u~C'cl in 
rulcmaking is ;;ubstantinlly similar to the original pro\· i~ioll in the 
1946 Admini~t rative Procedure Act. Ser Pub. L. 70-·10 ~. 60 
Stat. 238. 
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opportunity for an agency hearing," thus triggering the 
applicability of § 556, subsection d provides that the 
agency may proceed by the submission of all or part 
of the evidence in written form if a. party will not be 
"prejudiced thereby." Again the Act makes it plain 
that a specific statutory mandate that the proceedings 
take place on the record after hearing may be satisfied in 
some circumstances by evidentiary submission in written 
form only. 
We think this treatment of the term "hearing'' in the 
Administrative Procedure Act affords a sufficient basis 
for concluding that the requirement of a "hearing" con-
tained in § 1 (14)(a), in a situation where the Commis-
sion was acting under the 1966 statutory rulemaking 
authority which Congress had conferred upon it, did not 
by its ovvn force require the Commission either to hear 
oral testimony, to permit cross-examination of Commis-
sion witnesses, or to hear oral argument. Here the 
Commission promulgated a tentative draft of an order, 
and accorded all interested parties 60 days in which 
to file stutements of position, submissions of evidence, 
and other relevant observations. The parties had fair 
notice of exactly what the Commission proposed to do, 
and were given an opportunity to comment, to object, 
or to make some other form of written submission. The· 
final order of the Commission indicates that it gave con-
sideration to the statements of the two appellees here. 
Given the "open-ended" nature of the proceedings, and 
the Commission's announced willingness to consider pro-
posals for modification after operating experience had 
been acquired, we think the hearing requirement of 
§1(14)(a) of the Act was met. 
Appellee railroads cite a number of our previous de-
cisions dealing in some manner with the right to a hearing 
in an administrative proceeding. Although appellees 
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have asserted no claim of constitutional deprivation in 
this proceeding, some of the cases they rely upon ex-
pressly speak in constitutional terms, while others are 
less than clear as to whether they depend upon the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution, or upon generalized principles of 
administrative law formulated prior to the adoption of 
the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Morgan v. Uniled States, 304 U. S. 1 ( 1938), is cited 
in support of appellees' contention that the Commis-
sion's proceedings were fatally deficient. That opinion 
describes the proccedi ngs there involved as "quasi-judi-
cial." id., at 14, aucl thus presumably distinct from a 
rulemaking proceeding such as that engaged in by the 
Commission here. But since the order of the Secretary 
of Agriculture there challenged did involve a form of 
ratcmaking. the case bears e11ough resemblance to the 
facts of this case to warrant further examination of 
appellees' contention. The administrative procedure in 
Morgan was held to be defective primarily because the 
persons who were to be affected by the Secretary's order 
·were found not to have been adequately apprised of 
what the Secretary proposed to do prior to the time 
that he actually did it. Illustrative of the Court's rea-
soning is the following passage from the opinion: 
"The right to a hearing embraces not only the right 
to present evidence but also a reasonable oppor-
tunity to know the claims of the opposing party 
and to meet them. The right to submit argument 
implies that opportu11.ity; otherwise the right may 
be but a barren one. Those \vho are brought into 
contest with the government in a quasi-judicial pro-
ceeding aimed at the control of their activities arc 
entitled to be fairly advised of what the Govern-
ment proposes and to be heard upon its proposal 
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before it issues its final command." 304 U. S., at 
10.1' 
The proceedings before the Secretary of Agriculture 
had been initiated by a notice of inquiry into the rea-
sonableness of the rates in question, and the individuals 
being regulated suffered throughout the proceeding from 
its essential formlessness. The Court concluded that this 
formlessness denied the individuals subject to regulation 
the "full hearing'' \\'hich the statute had provided. 
Assuming arguendo that the statutory term "full hear-
ing" docs not differ significantly from the hearing require-
ment of ~ 1 (14)(a), we do not believe that the 
proceedings of the Interstate Commerce Commission be-
fore us suffer from thr defect found to be fatal in 
Morgan. Though the initial JJoticc of the proceeding 
by no means set out in detail what the Commission 
proposed to do, its tentative conclusions and order of 
December 1960. could scarcely have been more explicit 
or detailed. All interested parties '"ere given 60 days 
following the issuance of these tentative findings and 
order in which to make appropriate objections. Ap-
pellees were "fairly advised" of rxactly 'vhat the Com-
mission proposed to do sufficiently in advance of the 
entry of the final order so as to give them adequate 
time to formulate and to present objections to the Com-
mission's proposal. Morgan, therefore, docs not aid 
appellees. 
ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88 
(1913), involved what the Court there described as a 
"quasi-judicial" proceeding of a quite different nature 
"Thi~ ~anw lanp;uagr wa~ ritrcl with :t]lpro,·nl b~· t hr Court in 
lf'ilner Y. Committee on Clwrarter, :37:3 U. S. 9G, 105 (1963), in 
whieh it was hPid thnt an applir:mt for ndmi~sion to thr bar could 
not be clenircl sneh ndmi~~ion on t hP ba~i~ of ex parte ~tatemrnts of 
other~ whozn he had I!Ot brrzz nffonkd nn O]lportunif.l' to cross-
rxnminr. 
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than the one we review here. The provisions of the 
Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, and of the Hep-
burn Act. 34 Stat. 584. in eHect at the time that case 
was decided left to the railroad carriers the "primary 
right to make rates," 227 U. S., at 92, but granted to 
the Commission the authority to set them aside if after 
hearing they were shmvn to be unreasonable. The pro-
ceeding before the Commission in that case had been 
instituted by the Ke"· Orleans Board of Trade complain-
ing that certain class and commodity rates charged by 
the Louisville and Kashvllle Railway from l\ew Orleans 
to other points were unfair, unreasonable, and discrimi-
natory. 227 U. S .. at 90. The type of proceeding there, 
in which the Commission adjudicated a complaint by a 
shipper that specified rates set by a carrier were unrea-
sonable, was sufficiently diHerent from the nationwide 
incentive payments ordered to be made by all rail-
roads in this proceeding so as to make the Louisville & 
Nashville opinion inapplicable in the case presently 
before us. 
The basic distinction between rulemaking and aclj u-
dication is illustrated by this Court's treatment of two 
related cases under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In Londoner v. Denver, cited in 
oral argument by appellees, 210 U. S. 373 ( 1908). the 
Court held that clue process had not been accorded a 
landowner who objected to the amount assessed against 
his land as its share of the benefit resulting from the 
paving of a street. Local procedure had accorded him 
the right to file a written complaint and objection, but 
not to be heard orally. This Court held that due process 
of law required that he "have the right to support his 
allegations by argument however brief, and , if need be, 
by proof, however informal." !d., at 386. But in the 
later case of Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board 
of Equalization, 239 U. S. 441 (1915), the Court held 
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that no hearing at all was constitutionally required prior 
to a decision by state tax officers in Colorado to increase 
the valuation of all taxable property in Denver by 
a substantial percentage. The Court distinguished Lon-
doner by stating that there a small number of persons 
"were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individ-
ual grounds." 239 U. S. 445, 446. 
Later decisions have continued to observe the dis-
tinction adverted to in Bi-Metallic Investment Co., supra. 
In Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion, 301 U. S. 292, 304--305· ( 1937). the Court noted 
the fact that the administrative proceeding there in-
volved was designed to require the utility to refund 
previously collected rate charges. The Court held that 
in such a proceeding the agency could not, consistently 
with due process, act on the basis of undisclosed evidence 
which was never made a part of the record before 
the agency. The case is thus more akin to Louisville & 
Nashville R. Co., supra. than it is to this case. FCC v. 
WJR, 337 U. S. 265 (1949), established that there was 
no across-the-board constitutional right to ora] argu-
ment in an:v administrative proceeding regardlf'ss of 
its nature. While the line dividing them may not n lways 
be a bright one. these decisions represent a recognized 
distinction in administrative law between proceedings 
for the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or 
standArdF:. on the one hand. and proceedings designed 
to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases on the 
other. 
Here the incentive payments proposed by the Com-
mission in its tentative order, and later adopted in its 
final order, were a.pp1icable across the board to aU of 
the common carriers by railroads subject to the Inter-
state Commerce Act. No effort was made to single 
out any particular railroad for special considrration based 
on its own peculiar circumstances. Indeed. one of the 
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objections of appellee Florida East Coast was that it 
and other terminating carriers should have been treated 
differently from the generality of the railroads. But 
the fact that the order may in its effects have been 
thought more disadvantageous by some railroads than 
by others docs not change its generalized nature. Though 
the Commission obviously relied on factual inferences 
as a basis for its order, the source of these factual 
inferences "·as apparent to anyone who read the order 
of December 1969. The factual inferences were used 
in the formulation of a basically legislative-type judg-
ment, for prospective application only, rather than in 
adjudicating a particular set of disputed facts. 
The Commission's procedure satisfied both the provi-
sions of § 1 (14) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act 
and of the Administrative Procedure Act, and were not 
inconsistent 'vith prior decisions of this Court. We 
therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court. 
and remand the case so that it may consider those con-
tentions of the parties which are not disposed of by 
this opmwn. 
